Jammu and Kashmir: In the Shadow of Imperialism Home
Maharaj K. Kaul
[Taken from Essays in Inequality and Social Justice (Essays in honor of Ved Prakash Vatuk), Edited by Kira Hall, Archana Publications, Meerut, India, 2009]
CONCLUSIONS
Had the imperialist interest in Jammu and Kashmir and the accompanying international attention been missing, the utility of the secessionist card would have been lost. The democratic process in the state would have been strengthened: Kashmiris would have yielded a proportionate share of political power and administrative authority to non-Kashmiri communities in the state, who would have received equitable representation, attention, and development funds; and the state would have developed a secular culture. The Center’s largesse would have been dictated by economic criteria rather than by political considerations. Interference by Pakistan may have been an irritant but could have been effectively kept in check. But the geographical location of the region was too important for the imperialists to ignore.
In 1975, Abdullah was back at the helm in JKI and stayed there until his death in 1982. This period of Abdullah showed him in full communalist regalia. He strengthened fundamentalist forces in the state: hundreds of places, villages, and towns were stripped of their pre-Islamic names and given new Islamized names; more Jamat-i-Islami schools were opened; a medical college reserved for Arab students was constructed; and many overtly communal policies were put into effect. By allowing Friday prayers in Government offices, the state administrative machinery was steadily Islamized. Pakistani and Saudi money, which began to arrive in large quantities, accelerated the process. This was Abdullah’s parting gift to Jammu and Kashmir.
While imperialism was wreaking havoc in neighboring Afghanistan in the 1980s and laying foundations for the institution of jehad, Abdullah had already prepared a receptive ground for jehad in Kashmir. In the mid-1980s, jehad was successfully steered east. Islamized Kashmiri youth, fed romantic fantasies of an independent Kashmir or of Nizam-e-Mustafa (the system of Prophet Mohammed), became the earliest carriers of this jehadi virus and became cannon-fodder in Pakistan’s proxy war. They were soon replaced by hard-core Islamists from within and without Kashmir. Kashmir was no longer Gandhi’s “shining example of secularism,” as he had named it in 1947. In 1990 alone, the year jehad began in the Valley in full fury, most of the 300,000 minority Hindus were driven away by Islamist terrorism while hundreds more were killed. Over the next two decades over 40,000 civilians, terrorists, and security personnel were killed.
The major blame for Jammu and Kashmir’s steep decline into intolerance and terrorism rests with imperialism. Pakistan, who partnered with imperialism and was its tool, contributed to this degeneration in a direct way, but it could not have succeeded without the support and encouragement of imperialist powers. Pakistan is America’s gateway to the riches of Central Asia and will remain the United States’ key ally in Asia in the foreseeable future. In fact, the United States has already declared Pakistan to be a major non-NATO ally. In other words, Pakistan has a license to continue its jehad in Jammu and Kashmir until the time it begins to subvert U.S. goals in the region. Even if jehad stops or is decisively defeated, it will take years, if not decades, to rebuild the secular and democratic institutions in Jammu and Kashmir that have undergone continuous erosion over the years as a result of imperialist meddling and Pakistan’s proximity. Until that day dawns, the agony of Jammu and Kashmir will continue.
NOTES
1 These numbers are best estimates, based on previous Special Censuses or demographic studies (Warikoo 1996; Om 1999:54-63). For instance, there are conflicting estimates regarding the proportion of the Gujjar population in Kashmir province; the difference between the most extreme of these estimates is about 6%. The figures reported in Tables 3 and 4 represent the average of these estimates, which puts the Gujjar population in Kashmir at a little over 7%. Any other demographic changes after 1981 are expected to have an insignificant impact on the percentages reported in these Tables.
2 The Muslim Conference was revived in 1940 as an appendage of the Muslim League, dominated by non-Kashmiris. It was given a new life, albeit anemic, by Jinnah during his 1944 visit to the Valley.
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