Jammu and Kashmir: In the Shadow of Imperialism Home
Maharaj K. Kaul
[Taken from Essays in Inequality and Social Justice (Essays in honor of Ved Prakash Vatuk), Edited by Kira Hall, Archana Publications, Meerut, India, 2009]
THE BRITISH ROLE IN THE 1947 WAR
After retreating from the subcontinent, Britain desired to maintain friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. But when the two newly created Dominions of the subcontinent went to war in 1947, the British chose to placate a feudal Pakistan willing to work as an imperialist outpost in Asia rather than take the side of the aggrieved party, the anti-imperialist India. This became possible because Britain still exercised considerable control over the new states.
The first effect of continuing British control in the subcontinent was felt in Gilgit in Jammu and Kashmir State. The region, which had been leased in 1935 to the British for a sixty-year period, had reverted back to the Maharaja on the lapse of Paramountcy. The British officers who were in control now reported to the Maharaja and were expected to defend the region when the Pakistan-sponsored invasion was launched on Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947. But soon after Jammu and Kashmir decided to accede to India, these British officers switched their loyalty to Pakistan and engineered a series of military revolts in Gilgit by Gilgit Scouts (under Major W. Brown with the help of his adjutant, Capt. Mathison), followed by similar revolts in Chitral, Hunza, Dir, and Nagar. Ultimately, almost the whole Gilgit-Baltistan region was gifted by the British and Britain-supported rebels to Pakistan.
Britain’s continuing control over the new states was obvious during the 1947 war. The Governor General of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was a Briton, and even though he was supposed to be only a titular head, he became the Chairman of the Defense Committee of India, a role that he used to advance British interests at India’s expense during the war. The Supreme Commander of the military forces of both India and Pakistan was Field Marshal Claude John Auchinleck until November 30, 1947, when the Supreme Command was dissolved at India’s insistence. Auchinleck had incurred the hostility of Indian leaders for his partiality towards Pakistan in the division of military stores and his role in the Junagadh affair. The Commander-in-Chief of the Indian forces was General Rob Lockhart until January 1948 and then Roy Bucher; the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani forces was General Douglas Gracey. All of them were Britons. Lockhart resigned under pressure when Nehru learned that he had failed to inform the Indian Government of the impending invasion of Jammu and Kashmir that Gracey had communicated to him. Lockhart’s replacement, Roy Bucher, was no better. He overruled Maj. General K. S. Thimayya when the latter proposed air strikes against a large concentration of Pathan invaders in the Poonch Sector in 1948 (Chopra 1990:53).
British sympathies lay with Pakistan, a likely future military ally. As a result, even though India was militarily in a position to throw out the Pakistani army and Pakistan-supported raiders, it did not do so because of the subversion within. For instance, India could have taken the war to West Punjab. Nehru had considered this option on October 27, and India ultimately did exactly this in 1965 in order to wipe out Pakistan’s military advantage in Jammu and Kashmir. But India chose not to do so at that time and instead settled for a Pakistani-dictated and British-supported division of the state. A letter written by Gracey to Mountbatten at that time warned:
In other words, Gracey was advocating the division of the state along the Uri-Poonch-Naushehra line, which ultimately did become the cease-fire line between India and Pakistan. The possibility of such division had been predicted by TASS correspondent O. Orestov, who was in Srinagar in November of 1947. Orestov had pointed out that the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), which was still under Congress rule, bordered Muzaffarabad in the west of the state. But the capture of Muzaffarabad by Indian troops would not have been to Pakistan’s liking, and the British in India ensured that it did not happen (Raina 1988).
if Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their home; if India is not to be allowed to sit on the door step of Pakistan, likely to enter the rear and on the flank…; if civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naushehra. (Brecher 1953:45)
