Jammu and Kashmir: In the Shadow of Imperialism Home
Maharaj K. Kaul
[Taken from Essays in Inequality and Social Justice (Essays in honor of Ved Prakash Vatuk), Edited by Kira Hall, Archana Publications, Meerut, India, 2009]
EXIT BRITAIN, ENTER THE UNITED STATES
With Britain weakened after World War II, the United States began to take over the major tasks of imperialism worldwide. Indeed, this shift had already begun during the War to some extent: for instance, Major Loren Tutell, Commander of the Fifth Combat Camera Unit in the Pacific, and Nicol Smith, an Intelligence Agent with OSS who had served in France, India, Siam, Ceylon, and China, had explored Kashmir and surrounding areas for a “level spot for a landing,” i.e., an area for an air base (Chopra 1990:23). In August of 1946, the American Red Cross opened its office in Srinagar. Around the same time, the National Geographic Society of America sent its photographer Volkmar Wentzel to Kashmir. In 1947, an American, Russel K. Haight, participated in the tribal invasion of Kashmir and is reported to have served as a Brigadier-General in the Pakistan-organized tribal army. Americans chose for some time to defer to the more experienced British in matters of strategy in this part of the world. The British had long been engaged in their Great (Central Asian) Game of containing Russia and later the Soviet Union. This containment had assumed increased importance after 1919 when Amanullah Khan canceled Afghanistan’s Alliance Treaty with the British and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Britain had succeeded in 1935 in obtaining control of Gilgit and gifting it to Pakistan in the 1947 war. Other British accomplishments in which Mountbatten played a very crucial role include the partition of India, the 1947 war in Kashmir, and India’s reference to the United Nations Security Council in 1948. In short, the British knew this part of the world much better than the Americans. The Americans, therefore, had to rely on Britain as facilitators for their work in South Asia. The nature of the relationship between the United States and Britain with respect to policy in South Asia was succinctly expressed by the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in a conversation with Loy Henderson in London, who was on his way to India after being appointed U.S. Ambassador in December 1948: “There is a country where we must keep together, although you must let us be in the shop window” (Bevin 1948, cited in Brands 1991:198). In essence, Henderson and Bevin jointly proposed a common U.S.-British front for dealing with the Government of India that would not give the impression that the two were in collusion.
But by the end of 1949, the situation in Asia had dramatically changed and so did the American strategy. Chiang Kai Shekh’s forces had been routed, and mainland China came under the control of the communists, who quickly joined with the Soviet Union in a treaty of alliance and friendship. Additionally, the Soviet Union had made an amazingly quick recovery from the devastation of World War II and had also broken the American monopoly on the atom bomb. Britain had been considerably weakened by the war, and even though the United States and Britain continued to coordinate their work, the Americans began to take a leading role in the affairs of South Asia. 
The overriding goal of both Britain and America after 1949 was to engage aggressively in the ‘containment’ of China and the Soviet Union. It was this strategic goal, together with a desire for unfettered access to Gulf oil and India’s refusal to be part of this Anglo-American game that dictated U.S. policy towards India, Pakistan, and Kashmir. On August 14, 1948, the Economist outlined these conflicts in the following manner:
An important goal of Anglo-Americans in South Asia thus became to wrest control of Jammu and Kashmir from India. This would secure access to the northern regions of Gilgit, Baltistan, and Ladakh and thereby extend the American reach to the borders of the Soviet Union and China. Jammu and Kashmir’s independence could easily be bought by U.S. dollars, enabling Americans to establish military bases in the state, monitor the countries that surround it (i.e., Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), and facilitate subversion and military intervention in the region.
India’s complaint against Pakistan to the United Nations in 1948, at Mountbatten’s insistence, provided the Americans a much wanted opportunity for direct intervention in Kashmir. The United States, with the help of Britain, turned Kashmir into a dispute between the aggressor and the aggrieved, and then pretended to be an honest broker in the ‘dispute.’ Anglo-American maneuvers in pursuance of this goal included the appointment of Admiral Chester Nimitz as the Plebiscite Administrator over Indian objections; the insistence on the constitution of an ‘interim’ Kashmir government, which amounted to the dissolution of the popular government of the National Conference; the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan after its Third Interim Report in which the Czechoslovakian member, Dr. Oldrich Chyle, presented a dissenting view that took Britain and the United States to task for interference in the Commission’s workings; and the appointment of many mediators afterwards. With the formation of the Peoples’ Republic of China in 1949, it became important to win over India in furtherance of American policies in that part of the world. But the United States viewed a number of India’s actions as hostile, such as Nehru’s criticism of the American role in the Korean war. Moreover, India had refused to sign on to the U.S.-imposed peace treaty with Japan, even though it had been signed by all American allies including Pakistan (India ultimately signed a separate peace treaty with Japan). Finally, India had insisted that the People’s Republic of China be admitted into the United Nations. Indeed, even the New York Times called Nehru “The Lost Leader” and “one of the greatest disappointments of the post war era” (Raina 1988:191).
Apart from the fact that Pakistan is the largest and perhaps the most influential Muslim state, Karachi provides an excellent harbour, commanding the approaches to the Persian Gulf with its oil installations, while the NWFP and West Punjab are situated only a few hundred miles from the highly industrialized areas of Russian Turkistan. ... How then does India fit into this picture? ... The answer seems to be that India does not fit at all. (Raina 1988:174)
